William Gibson: the future will find you out

June 28, 2003

An inter­est­ing arti­cle on George Orwell and the future we’ve become. What would Orwell have thought about the big broth­er of nation­al secu­ri­ty and the never-ending war on ter­ror. And what would he have thought of the inter­net and blogs? Here’s a snippet:

“In the age of the leak and the blog, of evi­dence extrac­tion and link dis­cov­ery, truths will either out or be out­ed, lat­er if not soon­er. This is some­thing I would bring to the atten­tion of every diplo­mat, politi­cian and cor­po­rate leader: the future, even­tu­al­ly, will find you out.

It’s hard not to make the connection

June 21, 2003

In Iraq, U.S. sol­diers are blar­ing the sound­tract to ‘Apoc­a­lypse Now’ to psych them­selves up to war:

“With Wag­n­er’s ‘Ride of the Valkyries’ still ring­ing in their ears and the clat­ter of heli­copters over­head, sol­diers rammed vehi­cles into met­al gates and hun­dreds of troops raid­ed hous­es in the west­ern city of Ramadi”

Mean­while in my home­town of Philadel­phia four teenagers lis­tened to the Bea­t­les’ ‘Hel­ter Skel­ter’ over forty times before attack­ing and beat­ing to death one of their friends.
   Hor­rif­ic as both sto­ries are, what strikes me is the choice of music. ‘Hel­ter Skel­ter’ and most of the music on ‘Apoc­alpse Now’ were writ­ten in the late 1960 and ear­ly 70s (the movie itself came out in 1979). Why are today’s teenagers pick­ing the music of their par­ents to plan their attacks? Can’t you kill to Radio­head or Linkin Park? Could­n’t the Philly kids have shown some home­town pride and picked Pink? Why the Oldies Music? Seri­ous­ly, there have been some topsy-turvy gen­er­a­tional sur­pris­es in the sup­port and oppo­si­tion to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Is there some sort of strange fetish for all things 70s going on here?

It’s hard not to make the connection.

June 21, 2003

In Iraq, U.S. sol­diers are blar­ing the sound­tract to ‘Apoc­a­lypse Now’ to psych them­selves up to war:

“With Wag­n­er’s ‘Ride of the Valkyries’ still ring­ing in their ears and the clat­ter of heli­copters over­head, sol­diers rammed vehi­cles into met­al gates and hun­dreds of troops raid­ed hous­es in the west­ern city of Ramadi”

Mean­while in my home­town of Philadel­phia four teenagers lis­tened to the Bea­t­les’ ‘Hel­ter Skel­ter’ over forty times before attack­ing and beat­ing to death one of their friends.

Hor­rif­ic as both sto­ries are, what strikes me is the choice of music. ‘Hel­ter Skel­ter’ and most of the music on ‘Apoc­alpse Now’ were writ­ten in the late 1960 and ear­ly 70s (the movie itself came out in 1979). Why are today’s teenagers pick­ing the music of their par­ents to plan their attacks? Can’t you kill to Radio­head or Linkin Park? Could­n’t the Philly kids have shown some home­town pride and picked Pink? Why the Oldies Music? Seri­ous­ly, there have been some topsy-turvy gen­er­a­tional sur­pris­es in the sup­port and oppo­si­tion to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Is there some sort of strange fetish for all things 70s going on here?

The Selling of the Iraq War

June 21, 2003

The New Repub­lic has a long arti­cle by John B Jud­is & Spencer Ack­er­man detail­ing the sub­ver­sion of the intel­li­gence agen­cies to the polit­i­cal agen­da of the pro-war hawks in the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion. The job of the Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency is to pro­vide the U.S. with cred­i­ble infor­ma­tion on threats to nation­al secu­ri­ty. Sub­vert­ing it to fit a polit­i­cal agen­da is the real threat to nation­al security.

“Had the admin­is­tra­tion accu­rate­ly depict­ed the con­sen­sus with­in the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty in 2002 – that Iraq’s ties with Al Qae­da were incon­se­quen­tial; that its nuclear weapons pro­gram was min­i­mal at best; and that its chem­i­cal and bio­log­i­cal weapons pro­grams, which had yield­ed sig­nif­i­cant stocks of dan­ger­ous weapons in the past, may or may not have been ongo­ing – it would have had a very dif­fi­cult time con­vinc­ing Con­gress and the Amer­i­can pub­lic to sup­port a war to dis­arm Saddam.”

Michael Kinsley: Did it matter if Iraq didn’t have WMD?

June 20, 2003

By now, WMD have tak­en on a myth­ic role in which fact does­n’t play much of a part. The phrase itself – ‘weapons of mass destruc­tion’ – is more like an incan­ta­tion than a descrip­tion of any­thing in particular.”

Here’s a nos­tal­gic list­ing of Bush Admin­is­tra­tion quotes assur­ing us WMDs exist­ed. (Thanks toStuffed­Dog for the link)

North Korean nukes and cowboy politics

June 16, 2003

Yes­ter­day North Korea claimed that it has processed enough plu­to­ni­um to make six nuclear weapons. I’ve often argued that wars don’t begin when the shoot­ing actu­al­ly begins, that we need to look at the mil­i­taris­tic deci­sions made years before to see how they plant­ed the seeds for war. After the First World War, the vic­to­ri­ous allies con­struct­ed a peace treaty designed to humil­i­ate Ger­many and keep its econ­o­my stag­nant. With the onslaught of the Great Depres­sion, the coun­try was ripe for a mad dem­a­gogue like Hitler to take over with talk of a Greater Germany.

In his Jan­u­ary 2002 State of the Union address, Pres­i­dent Bush’s team added North Korea to the “axis of evil” that need­ed to be chal­lenged. By all accounts it was a last minute addi­tion. The speech­writ­ing team nev­er both­ered to con­sult with the State Depart­men­t’s East Asia experts. In all like­li­hood North Korea was added so that the evil three coun­tries would­n’t all be Mus­lim (the oth­er two were Iraq and Iran) and the “War on Ter­ror” would­n’t be seen as a war against Islam.

North Korea saw a bull­dog pres­i­dent in the White House and judged that its best chance to stay safe was to make a U.S. attack too dan­ger­ous to con­tem­plate. It’s a sound strat­e­gy, real­ly only a vari­a­tion on the Cold War’s “Mutu­al­ly Assured Destruc­tion” doc­trine. When faced with a hos­tile and militaristically-strong coun­try that wants to over­throw your gov­ern­ment, you make your­self too dan­ger­ous to take on. Let’s call it the Rat­tlesnake Defense.

Mil­i­tarism rein­forces itself when coun­tries beef up their mil­i­taries to stave off the mil­i­taries of oth­er coun­tries. With North Korea going nuclear, pres­sure will now build on South Korea, Chi­na and Japan to defend them­selves against pos­si­ble threat. We might be in for a new East Asian arms race, per­haps an East Asian Cold War. Being a paci­fist means stop­ping not only the cur­rent war but the next one and the one after that. In the 1980s activists were speak­ing out against the bru­tal regime of Sad­dam Hus­sein, an Amer­i­can friend who was gassing his own peo­ple. Now we need to speak out against the cow­boy pol­i­tics that is feed­ing insta­bil­i­ty on the Kore­an Penin­su­la, to pre­vent the hor­ror and mass death that a Sec­ond Kore­an War would unleash.

How Can We Measure the State of the Peace Movement?

June 10, 2003

One of the prob­lems with the peace move­ment is that it rarely mea­sures itself. There are few met­rics that point to the effec­tive­ness of our work. There are a cou­ple of rea­sons for this:

  • It’s hard to mea­sure, often our sucess­es will be invisible;
  • Mea­sur­ing might show donors that favorite orga­ni­za­tions aren’t that influential;
  • We might real­ize we need to re-vision our work to speak to today’s con­di­tions rather than con­tin­u­al­ly try to re-create a “gold­en age” of peace move­ments past;
  • We might have to real­ly broad­en our coali­tions and invite new orga­ni­za­tions in.

Each peace move­ment group is an enti­ty unto itself. But they are also all parts of net­works with oth­er groups. Some­times these net­works are giv­en names and mem­ber­ship is for­mal­ly list­ed. But more often the net­works are infor­mal asso­ci­a­tions of like-minded orga­ni­za­tions who have shared his­to­ry, staff and past move­ment orga­niz­ing together.

The friend­ships behind these infor­mal alliances can often be a strength to over­worked staff peo­ple who can eas­i­ly feel dis­cour­aged. But it also means they all turn to each oth­er too much, and an effect which the mil­i­tary calls “incen­tu­ous ampli­fi­ca­tion” can occur. The heads of estab­lished peace groups will all talk only to the heads of oth­er peace groups to affirm each other’s impor­tance. Mean­while new groups are locked out of this bud­dy system.

Luck­i­ly the inter­net has giv­en us a way to mea­sure these net­works. If each estab­lished peace group is thought of as a “node,” then its impor­tance is a reflec­tion of it’s con­nec­tions to oth­er net­works and to oth­er nodes. Web search engines can mea­sure how many links each organization’s has with oth­er organizations.

Here at the Non­vi­o­lence Web, we pre­fer to use Altavista for this mea­sure­ment. A properly-constructed search query on Altavista will return the num­ber of links to the site’s home­page and to all of it’s sub-pages while not includ­ing the site’s own links to itself. Here’s the search string:

link:www.domain.org ‑url:www.domain.org

The num­bers reflect just how wide­ly our orga­ni­za­tions are linked to oth­er orga­ni­za­tions and where we fit in the larg­er net­works. Here’s how I’ve trans­lat­ed it for peace move­ment groups:

  • Under 100 links: unknown group, prob­a­bly a sin­gle individual’s pet project;
  • 100 – 500 links: a small group, respect­ed by its lim­it­ed core audi­ence but lit­tle known out­side it;
  • 500‑5000 links: a well-respected group thought of as the most pri­ma­ry source for a par­tic­u­lar type of activism but lit­tle known out­side the estab­lished peace movement;
  • 5,000 – 8,000 links: an impor­tant peace orga­ni­za­tion, well known and respect­ed out­side it’s core community;
  • 8,000 – 15,000 links: a well-known group even out­side the peace move­ment, one wide­ly rec­og­nized as being a hub of information.
  • 15,000 links: a widely-known orga­ni­za­tion such as Amnesty Inter­na­tion­al or Greenpeace.

Know­ing where we all stand acts as a good real­i­ty check for our ambi­tions. Each orga­ni­za­tion is strongest when it knows its core rep­u­ta­tion and bases its future work on a level-headed assess­ment of strengths, oppor­tu­ni­ties and weak­ness­es. We can be vision­ary and strate­gic —- indeed we must be to bring non­vi­o­lence to the world! —- but we must also be sure not to squan­der donors’ money.

One obvi­ous caveat: most peace orga­ni­za­tions don’t focus on the inter­net. A low rank­ing doesn’t mean that their work isn’t impor­tant or use­ful. Inter­net links are only one mea­sure­ment, one that needs to be tak­en in con­text. Still: when an indi­vid­ual or group links to our pages it does rep­re­sent a sort of endorse­ment, a indi­ca­tion that they iden­ti­fy with the work we’re doing. The link­er is telling oth­ers that this is a peace group they think their vis­i­tors should know about. We ignore these endorse­ments at our own folly.