Author Archives ⇒ Martin Kelley

“Have you ever felt like the fall guy?”

July 18, 2003
· Martin Kelley

In strange and sad news, the man who was prob­a­bly the unnamed “senior offi­cial” who first told the BBC that Britain “sexed up” its Iraq weapons dossier has turned up dead in the woods near his home. Dr. David Kel­ly gave evi­dence to the UK for­eign affairs com­mit­tee just days ago, where he asked the com­mit­tee “Have you ever felt like the fall guy?” One mem­ber of the com­mit­tee told the Guardian that “We thought he’d been put up quite delib­er­ate­ly to dis­tract us from the case of the gov­ern­men­t’s case for war.”

David Kel­ly has been described as a “soft spo­ken” man not used to the pub­lic glare he’s been under. Reports haven’t even giv­en the cause of death, so con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries will have to be put on hold. It’s quite pos­si­ble that this faith­ful civ­il ser­vant and sci­en­tist final­ly cracked under the pres­sure of the media onslaught and took his life. It is a tragedy for his family.

Army of None

July 17, 2003
· Martin Kelley

I’ve always found U.S. Army recruit­ing adver­tis­ing fas­ci­nat­ing. It’s not just that the ads are well-produced. They catch onto basic human yearn­ings in a way that’s the teen equiv­a­lent of self-help books. “Be all that you can be” is won­der­ful – who would­n’t want that. And the cur­rent ads mak­ing the Army look like a extreme sport also hits the nexus of cool and inspir­ing. The cur­rent US Army slo­gan is “An Army of One,” which might almost make poten­tial recruits for­get that a basic cor­ner­stone of mil­i­tary train­ing is wip­ing away indi­vid­u­al­i­ty to mold recruits into inter­changable units. The link above is to “Army of None,” a smart par­o­dy of the offi­cial recruit­ing site.

Army of None

July 17, 2003
· Martin Kelley

Recruit­ing Satire. I’ve always found U.S. Army recruit­ing adver­tis­ing fas­ci­nat­ing. It’s not just that the ads are well-produced. They catch onto basic human yearn­ings in a way that’s the teen equiv­a­lent of self-help books. “Be all that you can be” is won­der­ful – who would­n’t want that. And the cur­rent ads mak­ing the Army look like a extreme sport also hits the nexus of cool and inspir­ing. The cur­rent US Army slo­gan is “An Army of One,” which might almost make poten­tial recruits for­get that a basic cor­ner­stone of mil­i­tary train­ing is wip­ing away indi­vid­u­al­i­ty to mold recruits into inter­changable units. The link above is to “Army of None,” a smart par­o­dy of the offi­cial recruit­ing site.

North Korean nukes and cowboy politics

July 16, 2003
· Martin Kelley

Yes­ter­day North Korea claimed that it has processed enough plu­to­ni­um to make six nuclear weapons. I’ve often argued that wars don’t begin when the shoot­ing actu­al­ly begins, that we need to look at the mil­i­taris­tic deci­sions made years before to see how they plant­ed the seeds for war. After the First World War, the vic­to­ri­ous allies con­struct­ed a peace treaty designed to humil­i­ate Ger­many and keep its econ­o­my stag­nant. With the onslaught of the Great Depres­sion, the coun­try was ripe for a mad dem­a­gogue like Hitler to take over with talk of a Greater Germany.
In his Jan­u­ary 2002 State of the Union address, Pres­i­dent Bush’s team added North Korea to the “axis of evil” that need­ed to be chal­lenged. By all accounts it was a last minute addi­tion. The speech­writ­ing team nev­er both­ered to con­sult with the State Depart­men­t’s east Asia experts. In all like­li­hood North Korea was added so that the evil three coun­tries would­n’t all be Mus­lim (the oth­er two were Iraq and Iran) and the “War on Ter­ror” would­n’t be seen as a war against Islam.
North Korea saw a bull­dog pres­i­dent in the White House and judged that its best chance to stay safe was to make a U.S. attack too dan­ger­ous to con­tem­plate. It’s a sound strat­e­gy, real­ly only a vari­a­tion on the Cold War’s “Mutu­al­ly Assured Destruc­tion” doc­trine. When faced with a hos­tile and militaristically-strong coun­try that wants to over­throw your gov­ern­ment, you make your­self too dan­ger­ous to take on. Let’s call it the Rat­tlesnake Defense.
Mil­i­tarism rein­forces itself when coun­tries beef up their mil­i­taries to stave off the mil­i­taries of oth­er coun­tries. With North Korea going nuclear, pres­sure will now build on South Korea, Chi­na and Japan to defend them­selves against pos­si­ble threat. We might be in for a new east Asian arms race, per­haps an east Asian Cold War. Being a paci­fist means stop­ping not only the cur­rent war but the next one and the one after that. In the 1980s activists were speak­ing out against the bru­tal regime of Sad­dam Hus­sein, an Amer­i­can friend who was gassing his own peo­ple. Now we need to speak out against the cow­boy pol­i­tics that is feed­ing insta­bil­i­ty on the Kore­an Penin­su­la, to pre­vent the hor­ror and mass death that a Sec­ond Kore­an War would unleash.

“Darn Good Intelligence”

July 15, 2003
· Martin Kelley

The Wash­ing­ton Post has a remarkably-wrong asser­tion by George W. Bush. The Pres­i­dent says he decid­ed to start the war after he gave Sad­dam Hus­sein “a chance to allow the inspec­tors in, and he would­n’t let them in.”

Memo to Bush: Hus­sein did let them in (they were there when U.S. troop buildup start­ed in the Mideast). Over the last few weeks the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion has had a lot of trou­ble keep­ing its ali­bis straight but now the Pres­i­dent him­self is just being out of touch with real­i­ty. (This is start­ing to feel like the glo­ry days of the Rea­gan Admin­is­tra­tion.) He con­tin­ues to bul­ly real­i­ty out of the way, despite the expo­sure of forg­eries and the non-discovery of weapons of mass destruction:

“I think the intel­li­gence I get is darn good intel­li­gence. And the speech­es I have giv­en were backed by good intel­li­gence. And I am absolute­ly con­vinced today, like I was con­vinced when I gave the speech­es, that Sad­dam Hus­sein devel­oped a pro­gram of weapons of mass destruc­tion, and that our coun­try made the right decision.”

The Bean Defense

July 15, 2003
· Martin Kelley

Read­ers might remem­ber the field day I had a few weeks ago when US occu­py­ing forces announced they had uncov­ered a cache of beans. They claimed Sad­dam Hus­sein had stock­piled a few hun­dred bags of cas­tor beans to use to make a bio­log­i­cal agent called ricin. In my postUS: Iraqis Planned Oper­a­tion Fart and Stink I point­ed out that the sup­posed weapons worked on the well-documented prin­ci­ple that beans can pro­duce gas and indi­ges­tion – ricin just works espe­cial­ly well and con­cen­trates the effect enough to kill some­one in a par­tic­u­lar­ly messy way.

What I did­n’t do was Google ricin and Iraq. Today I did and found this fas­ci­nat­ing arti­cle that I missed at the time. U.S. Sec­re­tary of State Col­in Pow­ell claimed an Iraq/ricin con­nec­tion before the House Inter­na­tion­al Rela­tions Com­mit­tee back in ear­ly February:

“The ricin that is bounc­ing around Europe now orig­i­nat­ed in Iraq — not in the part of Iraq that is under Sad­dam Hus­sein’s con­trol, but his secu­ri­ty forces know all about it,” Pow­ell said.

Euro­pean intel­li­gence sources quick­ly dis­cred­it­ed this claim, point­ing out that it was obvi­ous the Euro­pean ricin was home-made and not Iraqi. The French were “stunned” that Pow­ell would make such a obviously-wrong state­ment, and the British flat­ly stat­ed they were “clear” that that ricin found in Lon­don was­n’t pro­duced in Iraq.

Here we have anoth­er instance of a senior US offi­cial claim­ing an easily-disprovable claim of Iraqi weapons of mass destruc­tion, just weeks after the now-infamous Niger/Iraq forgery appeared in the Pres­i­den­t’s State of the Union address. Pow­ell and oth­ers in the U.S. have trot­ted out the ricin threat repeat­ed­ly yet it’s hard to make a weapon out of the stuff. It’s real­ly only ever been used for a ridicu­lous James Bond-like assas­i­na­tion in 1991, when a Bul­gar­i­an agent is sup­posed to have killed a dis­si­dent in Lon­don using a ricin-filled pel­let fired from an umbrel­la tip (one is remind­ed of Austin Pow­er’s Dr. Evil: “I’m going to place him in an eas­i­ly escapable sit­u­a­tion involv­ing an over­ly elab­o­rate and exot­ic death”). As one site points out The cur­rent wis­dom among bio­log­i­cal defense experts is that ricin is more like­ly to be used as a tool in assas­si­na­tions than as a weapon of mass destruction.

There is a clear pat­tern of the Bush Admin­is­tra­tion delib­er­ate­ly mis-interpreting Iraqi threats to make the case for war. These are pur­pose­ful decep­tions with only the thinnest escape clause to wig­gle through when the lies are exposed. Col­in Pow­ell isn’t stu­pid enough to make this kind of repeat­ed mis­take and a year of dis­proven ricin alerts is a mark against the Admin­is­tra­tion’s integrity.

 

Classifying Intelligence Blunders

July 15, 2003
· Martin Kelley

The U.S. Jus­tice Depart­ment might be throw­ing out its pros­e­cu­tion of sus­pect­ed Al Qae­da ter­ror­ist Zacarias Mous­saoui because it does­n’t want to allow him to ques­tion anoth­er Al Qae­da detainee in court. With­out the tes­ti­mo­ny of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the judge might throw out the entire indict­ment against Mous­saoui. What’s the Jus­tice Department’s ratio­nale? It says any tes­ti­mo­ny “would nec­es­sar­i­ly result in the unau­tho­rized dis­clo­sure of clas­si­fied information.”

Almost three years lat­er, what kind of clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion could Mous­saoui pos­si­bly have? Sure­ly noth­ing that future ter­ror­ists could use. The only thing he could talk about is con­di­tions in the pris­ons. Bin al-Shibh is being held in a secret loca­tion under mil­i­tary law but has report­ed­ly con­fessed to being part of the 9/11 attacks. Sure­ly all the infor­ma­tion he knows about the attacks is also known by dozens of oth­er Al Qae­da mem­bers still at large. Why is U.S.Attorney John Ashcroft’s Jus­tice Depart­ment so ner­vous about let­ting bin al-Shibh speak in public?

A gov­ern­ment will clas­si­fy a piece of infor­ma­tion if it feels that its dis­clo­sure would threat­en nation­al secu­ri­ty: that with it, its ene­mies could use it to launch some new attack. But every­thing that Mous­saoui and bin al-Shibh know is already known by our ene­mies. Gov­ern­ments some­times will abuse their pow­er and declare some­thing clas­si­fied if it con­tatins infor­ma­tion that would be embar­rass­ing to its rep­u­ta­tion or its polit­i­cal leaders.

It’s a big deal to risk throw­ing away a case like this, and it seems like­ly that Ashcroft is try­ing to keep some piece of infor­ma­tion from the Amer­i­can peo­ple. He could be try­ing to keep skele­tons of past U.S. mis­deeds safe­ly in the clos­et, using “nation­al secu­ri­ty” as the blan­ket to cov­er up the truth. The two sus­pect­ed ter­ror­ists might know quite a bit about U.S. intel­li­gence coop­er­a­tion with Afghani ter­ror­ists dur­ing the 1980s (when they were aim­ing their attacks at the Sovi­et Union). They might know about U.S. intel­li­gence mis­takes that could have pre­vent­ed 9/11. They sure­ly know about con­di­tions in the secret pris­ons were even detainees’ names and loca­tions are con­sid­ered “clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion.” Who’s secu­ri­ty would be threat­ened if this kind of infor­ma­tion got published?